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This paper examines the potential impact of the economic crisis – started in 2008 – on the 
dynamics global foreign direct investment, especially in the new member states of the European 
Union. The global economic crisis that hit the world in 2008 has forced scholars and policy 
makers alike to rethink their approaches to the global economy, in particular to financial markets 
(including stock exchanges and portfolio investment). It can be hypothesised that the crisis has 
been particularly devastating because it has resulted from the coincidence of three factors: a 
cyclical downturn in the world economy; a structural change that hit certain industries which used 
to be star performers in the global economy (especially the automotive industry); and the collapse 
of the previous model of the financial industry based on excesses. This paper asks how this crisis 
affects foreign direct investment flows, with special attention being paid to the question of which 
locations are set to lose the least and which ones are set to lose the most. In this respect, 
particular attention is paid to the activities of subsidiaries of multinational enterprises. These 
subsidiaries can follow different scenarios as a response to the global economic turmoil, including 
a reorganization of their production systems, and a reduction or closure of activities that are 
deemed to be less necessary for the continuation of activities. Finally, the paper examines the 
policy implications of the crisis. It challenges the view that rising economic nationalism (in the 
form of protecting one location against locations in other countries) would be the right answer to 
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Keywords: foreign direct investment, credit crunch, foreign subsidiaries, Europe 
JEL: F01, F23, O30 
 
* Corresponding author: Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211TC Maastricht, The Netherlands  
Tel: +31 43 3884415. E-mail: filippov@merit.unu.edu 
Date published: 06.05.2009 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology, 
UNU-MERIT 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research carried 
out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
 
  
4 
 
  
5 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The first indications of a global financial crisis emerged in the middle of 2007 with rising 
defaults on subprime mortgages in the U.S. The crisis of money markets erupted in 2008. Stock 
markets have fallen, large financial institutions have collapsed or been bought out by the state, 
and governments around the world had to come up with rescue packages to bail out their 
financial systems. Not only private financial institutions (such as Lehman Brothers and Morgan 
Stanley), but even nations (such as Iceland) found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. As 
financial institutions have been increasingly forced to raise capital and tackle the liquidity 
problem, decreasing international bank lending, falling stock exchanges, declining portfolio 
investment, and initial public offerings (IPOs) put the international financial market on hold. 
The onset of the financial crisis coincided with a structural crisis in the world economy. 
Industries that used to perform well in terms of growth over a long historical period, developed 
huge excess capacities, and as global demand started to weaken, they fell into a deep recession. 
Of all industries of the world, automotive has been the most hit. For decades, the industry 
benefited largely from the expansion of the motorist society, based on an extensive use of 
hydrocarbons. However, once that model came to a halt in its largest consumer societies (the 
developed countries), and income at disposal for further consumption dwindled (partly due to 
the financial crisis), the automotive industry entered the deepest recession of its history. 
The financial crisis also coincided with a third unfavourable movement, namely the 
slowdown of the economic cycle. This made the effects of the crisis particularly devastating, and 
has forced scholars to rethink their thinking about the roles of market forces and State 
intervention. 
This paper examines the impact of the triple crisis on foreign direct investment (FDI), 
with special reference to the situation in the new member states of the European Union (EU). It 
has to be emphasised that FDI has reacted to the crisis differently from portfolio investment, due 
to differences between the two. Portfolio investment and FDI both entail ownership of 
shares/stock. However, this ownership is fundamentally different. Portfolio investment is limited 
to minority participation (usually less than 10% of shares), and as a rule, it has no management 
influence and pursues purely financial interest. Therefore, it has short-term or temporary time 
range. On the other hand, foreign direct investment implies majority or even full ownership and 
strong management influence (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). As it has “build and expand” 
character, it operates in the long-term time range. In other words, portfolio investment is mostly 
about financial interests, while FDI is mostly about technology, management skills (the so-called 
“ownership advantages” of multinational enterprises (MNEs)), and about the organisation of the 
international division of labour (the so-called “internalisation advantages”) (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). 
The benefits of FDI argued by the academic literature and policymakers alike include 
capital investment, employment opportunities, generation of tax revenues, higher exports, and 
access to foreign technologies. As Joseph Stiglitz noted, “The argument for foreign direct investment … 
is compelling. Such investment brings with it not only resources, but also technology, access to markets, and 
(hopefully) valuable training, an improvement in human capital. Foreign direct investment is also not as volatile – 
and therefore as disruptive – as the short-term flows that can rush into a country and, just as precipitously, rush 
out” (Stiglitz, 2000: 1076). 
As a result of the main differences, portfolio investment and FDI have reacted differently 
to the crisis. Portfolio investment fell precipitously in response to the coupled effects of the 
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financial crisis and cyclical slowdown, making these flows negative in most cases. In turn, FDI, 
which represents longer-term strategic interest in companies, reacted less to the coupled effects 
of the triple crisis, strong reaction was mostly confined to activities that have been affected by the 
structural crisis, such as the automotive industry. It is true that MNEs, faced with the problem of 
financial liquidity on the global market, falling corporate profits and gloomy prospects, have had 
to readjust their expansion strategies and postpone already planned investment projects. As a 
consequence, it is expected that FDI flows decline. The tempo is however slower, given the fact 
that MNEs have their own financial resources, and their projects already engaged before the 
crisis are expected to continue. One should also consider that there are industries that are little hit 
by the crisis (e.g. food and beverages), and certain niche activities that even benefit from the crisis 
(e.g. fast food, which replaces more expensive restaurants). 
This study uses various forms of evidence as measurement, including flows of FDI, 
measures of activities of the subsidiaries1 of MNEs and other evidence, as appropriate. 
Similarly to domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries are at jeopardy as the crisis unfolds. 
However, unlike any domestic firm, a foreign subsidiary is a unique object of analysis due to its 
dual nature – being a part of an MNE and a host national economy. Moreover, a recent stream of 
literature on subsidiaries of MNEs has emphasised a significant heterogeneity of subsidiaries. 
Therefore it is not surprising that response to the economic crisis will depend not only on the 
industry, host economy, but more so, on the type of a given subsidiary. 
In this paper we analyse the responses of the established foreign subsidiaries to the crisis, 
in function of their role and type, and in the specific setting of the European Union. In most 
cases we focus on Central and Eastern European new EU member states. This focus is justified 
by the fact that FDI was an important engine of transition towards market economy in these 
countries in the 1990s. It is no surprise that subsidiaries of foreign MNEs became an important 
part of national economies (Hunya, 2000). Because of its dependence on inward FDI, these 
economies represent a good case for the analysis of the potential impact of the crisis on 
operations of foreign subsidiaries. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next session presents an overview of the current 
situation in terms of FDI flows and stocks. Section 3 provides analysis of the consequences of 
the crisis for foreign subsidiaries, particularly in new EU member states. Section 4 elaborates on 
the prospects in times of global crisis. Finally, section 5 provides policy implications. 
                                                 
1 MNEs can own various types of entities abroad, including subsidiaries (enterprises incorporated in host countries in which the 
MNEs directly own more than a half of the shares), associate companies (enterprises incorporated in host countries in which the 
MNEs own at least 10%, but not more than half, of the shares), and branches (wholly or jointly owned unincorporated 
enterprises, such as offices of the MNEs). These three types of entities together are referred to as foreign affiliates (UNCTAD, 
2008, p. 249). This study focuses on subsidiaries, the units most directly controlled by MNEs. 
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2. Foreign Direct Investment Flows: Worldwide and Europe 
 
The year 2008 marked the end of a cycle in FDI. As the crisis unfolded and corporate and 
project finance were weakening, equity investment and foreign direct investment alike came 
under pressure. Many planned takeovers were put on hold and greenfield projects postponed as 
the financing got harder and business prospects gloomier. Existing projects also came under 
pressure, especially in terms of employment levels. At the “epicentre” of the crisis, developed 
countries suffered from a fall of FDI by one-third in 2008. Developing economies started to feel 
the impact later, and might remain less affected, although far from being immune of the crisis. 
Preliminary data for 2008 show a dampening effect of the crisis. According to the estimate that 
UNCTAD released recently (UNCTAD, 2009), global FDI inflows were estimated to decline by 
about 15% in 2008, to $1.7 trillion (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. FDI inflows, worldwide and by group of economies, 1980–2008 
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2009. 
The financial component of the triple crisis is transmitted to FDI through tighter credit 
conditions and lower corporate profits that weaken companies‟ capability to finance their 
overseas projects. On the other hand, the cyclical downturn and a heightened appreciation of risk 
have eroded business confidence and therefore companies‟ propensity to expand internationally. 
As a result, many large MNEs have revised their global expansion plans, and a large number of 
greenfield and cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) projects are being cancelled or 
suspended. The trend is widespread but particularly strong in the industries hit by the structural 
crisis (automotive industry and its suppliers in particular). 
The deterioration of investment prospects was progressive: the crisis had practically no 
impact on global FDI flows in 2007 and in the first half of 2008, but began to bite in the second 
half of 2008. Decline in global FDI in 2008 marked the end of a growth cycle which lasted four 
years (figure 1). A major concern now is how long the downturn will last and how deep it will go. 
The fall in FDI will certainly continue and deepen in 2009. Judging from preliminary data for the 
first quarter of 2009 on cross-border M&As as in indicator, there was a large fall in FDI in all 
three groups of economies (UNCTAD, 2009). In developing countries, a dramatic fall started in 
the first quarter of 2009: China showed a 26% decline in FDI inflows during the first two months 
  
8 
 
of 2009 over the same period of 2008; and FDI to the Republic of Korea were down by 38% in 
the first quarter of 2009 (UNCTAD, 2009). 
The current situation is different from the last financial crisis, which originated in 
emerging Asian economies in 1997, and adversely influenced FDI inflow into these economies. 
The current crisis (both generally and in FDI) emerged in the developed world (namely in the 
U.S.), and while it has sent shock waves throughout the globe, damaging developed, developing 
and transition economies, it has hit the first group most. 
Recent data (annex 1) suggests that the developed economies have been already hit hard 
by the crisis. Whereas the global foreign direct investment flows contracted by 15%, for the 
developed countries this decrease amounted to 25% (compared to flows in 2007). The decline of 
inward FDI flows has been particularly pronounced in Ireland (-140%), Finland (-134%), the 
Netherlands (-103%) and Italy (-67%), in that order. 
Evidence for the new EU member states remain mixed. According to UNCTAD 
estimates, the growth of FDI inflows continued by 34% in Romania, 8% in Hungary and 3% in 
the Czech Republic, while a fall in FDI inflows was recorded in Poland (-28%) (annex 1). These 
economies (classified “developed” in United Nations statistics) relied heavily on the FDI inflows 
for economic restructuring in the transition period in the 1990s; presently, they still rely on 
foreign investors, attracting FDI in higher value added industries and functions. The differences 
in FDI inflows in these countries can be explained by idiosyncratic structure of national 
economies. 
The same report suggests that FDI flows in developing and transition economies have 
been more resilient, as initially the repercussions of the crisis for them were limited. However, 
since the end of 2008 the intensification of the crisis has dramatically changed the outlook for 
developing and transition economies, and the negative impacts of the crisis are yet to be fully 
transmitted to them. 
The growth rate of FDI inflows to developing countries, although lower than in 2007, 
were expected to show an estimated 7% positive growth in 2008 (annex 1). Particularly, FDI 
flows to Africa were expected to have grown further, by 35%. Flows to East, South, and South-
East Asia may have risen as well during 2008, but by a slower rate than they did previously (only 
6%). FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean were expected to have shown significant 
resilience to the economic downturn and were expected to have increased by 9%. FDI flows to 
the transition economies of South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) were estimated to have maintained their upward trend and registered an impressive increase 
of 24%. Overall, four emerging economies of Brazil, China, India and the Russian Federation 
were all estimated to have experienced a rise in FDI in 2008, ranging from 11% in China to 85% 
in India. 
The impact of the crisis varies widely depending on region and country, and hence we 
shall witness varying impacts on the geographic patterns of FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2009). 
Nevertheless, some outcomes will be common for most countries, namely, weaker export 
revenues and therefore further pressures on current accounts and balance of payment, lower 
investment and growth rates, and higher unemployment. 
Specifically for the European Union, the European Commission (2008) estimates that the 
economic growth fell to about 1% in 2008, from around 3% in 2007. Moreover, it is forecast that 
the real GDP is to contract by almost 2% in the EU in 2009. Unemployment is set to rise 
reaching 8.75% in the EU in 2009, with even further increase in 2010. 
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3. Foreign Subsidiaries in the Times of Crisis 
 
This section analyses the possible responses of foreign subsidiaries in new EU member 
countries, using a typology of subsidiaries developed for a general global context. Despite the fact 
that it is not geared towards any specific grouping, and it is more applicable to manufacturing, 
than to services, subsidiaries, it seems to apply well to the case of the new EU member countries, 
where large flows of FDI often stared in manufacturing activities (in the garment, automotive 
and electronics industries, in particular). Moreover, with some adjustment, this typology can be 
also applied to newly emerging services FDI, too.  
 
a. A typology of subsidiaries 
In a manner similar to that of domestic firms, foreign subsidiaries are facing deteriorating 
market conditions, e.g. contracting consumer demand and difficulties in accessing financing. On 
the other hands, subsidiaries are parts and parcels of their respective MNEs (sister subsidiaries 
and parent companies). The impact of the crisis varies greatly depending on the industry, 
markets, countries, and in the case of subsidiaries – depending on the type of subsidiary. 
Although analysis can be rather speculative at this stage considering the uncertainty of the global 
markets, it does provide foundations for further research. 
Present day academic research on subsidiaries and subsidiary management places a great 
deal of emphasis on their heterogeneity, on the premise that subsidiaries assume different roles 
within a MNE (a corporate network). Extant body of research on subsidiaries has employed 
several typologies of subsidiary roles and strategies, where the most popular is the one 
distinguishing between subsidiaries in terms of product scope (product line extensions and new 
product areas), market scope (range of geographic markets available to the subsidiary) and value 
added scope (range of functions performed by the subsidiary – development, manufacturing, 
marketing). 
This typology stems from White and Poynter‟s (1984) pioneering study (and later – 
D‟Cruz, 1986) who provided a first typology of subsidiaries for the analysis of direct investment 
of U.S. firms in Canada. Originally, five types of subsidiaries were identified: miniature replica, 
marketing satellite, rationalised manufacturer, product specialist and strategic independent. The 
typology has been modified over time and widely used in studies on subsidiaries (Pearce, 1992, 
1999, 2001; Papanastassiou, 1995, 1999). In it most common form the present typology 
determines three types of subsidiaries: truncated miniature replica (TMR), rationalised product 
subsidiary (RPS) and world/regional product mandates (WPM). 
Firstly, the truncated miniature replica is the basic type of subsidiary pursuing a market-
seeking strategy by supplying already well-established goods to a particular market. Establishment 
of these subsidiaries was a reaction to barriers to trade. MNEs had to establish production within 
the host economy since high trade tariffs made goods produced elsewhere and imported into 
host economy uncompetitive. However, the global economy has undergone considerable 
changes. The most important change is the global liberalisation and proliferation of free trade. In 
fact, free trade heralded the demise of the miniature replica subsidiary. It would not be correct to 
imagine full disappearance of this type of subsidiary; rather, it is a transformation of this model. 
Miniature replica subsidiaries may exist in order to produce goods tailored to the idiosyncrasies of 
the domestic market. In fact, a miniature replica – minimalist subsidiary – can in fact serve several 
markets in addition to its host economy (with the same goods). Since these subsidiaries are 
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locally-oriented, the impact of the crisis will be translated through the situation on the local 
consumer good market. 
The rationalised producer subsidiary is becoming more important in the global economy. 
It pursues an efficiency-seeking imperative and assumes a specialised or complementary product 
responsibility. This subsidiary reaps the economies of scale (focusing on supply of products that 
makes intensive use of factors of production in which a host country has a comparative 
advantage) and manufactures goods for a very wide market scope (i.e. export-orientation and 
narrow product scope) in a cost-effective way. Rationalised producer is highly embedded into a 
MNE network, interdependent with other subsidiaries. Functional scope is very restricted. This 
subsidiary type can be further split into two types. Firstly, it is a specialised subsidiary, which 
produces a certain set of component parts and they are further processed by other parts of the 
corporate group. For example, this type of subsidiaries is abundantly present in the automotive 
industry. Secondly, a subsidiary can be an export platform meaning that it produces a certain set 
of existing final products for multi-country or global market. This type of subsidiary is 
particularly typical for the specific export industries. This distinction is for purely analytical 
reasons, where the main idea is that a rationalised producer manufactures intermediate products, 
and an export platform – final goods. These subsidiaries are oriented towards foreign markets, 
and therefore their performance is directly affected by the market conditions abroad, and even 
global demand for particular types of goods. 
World (or regional) product mandate (WPM/RPM) pursues a strategic asset-seeking 
imperative. This subsidiary is fully responsible for the creation, manufacturing, marketing, 
distribution and further development of a product. In order to receive this status, subsidiaries 
should possess distinctive competence. The success factors would include unique local 
technological competence, local science base (partnerships with local universities) or human 
capital (talented personnel). In other words, these distinctive capabilities and competences are 
used as inputs into product development process. WPM subsidiaries have by definition a wide 
geographical market scope (since they serve global markets); the product scope is narrow (only 
one of a few goods in which the subsidiary has gained competence) and the functional scope is 
very wide as the subsidiary possesses a full range of corporate functions. Emergence of WPM has 
been spurred by various factors, such as technological heterogeneity of individual countries 
(hence benefiting subsidiaries located in specific countries and internalising dispersed knowledge), 
ability of MNEs to coordinate efficiently and effectively dispersed subsidiaries (information and 
communication technologies is a key driver of this process). In house R&D capacity is very likely 
and even necessary for successful production of a product. These subsidiaries are affected by the 
developments on global markets, however, they are deeply rooted domestically. Therefore, a 
combination of both foreign and domestic factors should be taken into account when analysing 
possible impact of the global crisis. 
Moreover, there are various single-activity subsidiaries positioned at the extremes of 
value-adding chain, such as sales offices / marketing and post-sales services, stand-alone R&D 
laboratory and so on. The differences between main types of subsidiaries are summarised in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Comparative analysis of various types of subsidiaries 
 
Subsidiary 
type 
FDI Strategy Market scope Product scope Functional scope 
Minimalist 
subsidiary 
Market-
seeking 
Narrow and isolated (a 
host country, and possibly 
neighbouring countries) 
Extensive Limited (Production 
and routine marketing; 
R&D for local 
adaptation) 
Export 
platform 
Efficiency-
seeking 
Very wide  
(world / region) 
Limited Very limited 
(Production, no R&D) 
Rationalised 
producer 
Efficiency-
seeking 
Very wide  
(world / region) 
Intermediates 
for sister 
subsidiaries 
Very limited 
(Production, no R&D) 
Product 
mandate 
Asset-seeking Very wide  
(world / region) 
Limited Wide (R&D, 
production) 
Source: the authors. 
 
b. The case of new EU member states 
We attempt to apply this typology into a specific situation not only in time (the current 
crisis) but also in space: to the transition economies that became members of the European 
Union in 2004 and 2007. This geographical focus has major consequences for our analysis. 
Historically, in most economies in transition, from the mid-1990s onwards, inward FDI has 
gained importance in economic growth and transition to market economy (UNCTAD, 2003). 
Beyond its contribution to financial resources, investment, technology and providing access to 
markets, inward FDI in economies in transition has also played a role in the strengthening of the 
private sector and the emergence of market-economy behaviour, as well as the elimination of 
macroeconomic distortions inherited from earlier centrally planned systems (Kalotay, 2001). 
Industrial restructuring accelerated when privatization involving FDI was stepped up (Hunya, 
2000).  
FDI played a major role in the reintegration of countries in transition into the world 
economy in the 1990s. That resulted in an important, although uneven, participation of MNEs in 
privatization and the creation of a market economy. That logically meant that FDI had to play a 
role in economic transformation that was deeper than in non-transition economies at a similar 
level of development (Kalotay, 2001). This meant that FDI has a major impact in shaping the 
insertion of these countries into the international division of labour, favouring such forms as 
export platforms, established there. Moreover, countries in transition had to overcome a legacy 
of isolation by way of re-conquering their place in the international division labour. That was a 
process far from being complete, as evidenced by the relatively small amount of FDI these 
economies received within the EU, even after accession (figure 2, Kalotay, 2006). 
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Figure 2. Share of economies in transition in global FDI inflows, 1991–2007 
(Per cent) 
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Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database. 
 
The volume of FDI inflows can serve as a raw proxy for the activities of MNEs in a 
particular country, especially when other types of information are not readily available. However, 
it provides little information about the types and activities of subsidiaries established. Some data 
can be obtained from reports of national investment promotion agencies, but overall lack of 
detailed data represents a common problem in the studies of subsidiary roles and types. 
Based on the secondary data and analytical reports (cf. Hunya, 2000; Kalotay, 2006; 
Szanyi, 2006; UNCTAD, 2003, etc.), we can make several observations. In economies in 
transition, especially in new EU member states, subsidiaries with a product mandate are almost 
non-existent. They exist in the case of certain R&D laboratories. However, as most R&D by 
foreign subsidiaries is in the form of product development for parent firms, and is often related 
to production sites, only a small fraction of R&D belongs to this category. As product mandate 
subsidiaries belong to the variety which is least expected to be threatened by the crisis, unless the 
entire MNE goes bankrupt, this can explain the relative vulnerability of these countries to the 
global downturn. Minimalist subsidiaries are more frequent, especially as a result of large 
privatisation deals, under which large local market oriented units became foreign-owned without 
necessarily being deeply integrated in the corporate network. These subsidiaries might suffer in 
the crisis, especially in societies where the local consumer purchasing power declines (e.g. in the 
Baltic States and Hungary). 
It emerges that the efficiency-seeking export platform and rationalised producer are the 
main units of analysis in terms of assessing potential impact of the crisis. Such units are present 
not only in the manufacturing industries (automotive, electronics and garments) but also in 
export oriented services (such as shared services centres, and a large part of R&D activities).2 The 
distinction between export platform and rationalised producer is rather analytical. In the 
automotive industry, assembly plants can be usually treated as export platforms, while most of 
                                                 
2 This is why we can talk about an “R&D platform” in new EU member states (cf. Kalotay, 2005). 
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the spare part suppliers moving together with the automotive MNEs belong to the category of 
rationalised producer. However, as final producers and suppliers belong to the same network, 
they can be in fact treated together as a single type of subsidiaries. 
In the following sub-section we focus on the export platform of the automotive industry, 
as these subsidiaries represent a sizeable distinctive group. Since many Central and Eastern 
European countries rely heavily on this group of subsidiaries, the analysis of these subsidiaries 
bears ultimate importance for entire national economies. 
 
c. The case of the automotive export platforms 
Economies in transition are home to a large number of export platforms, especially in the 
automotive and electronics industries (Kalotay, 2002). While these new EU members has 
attracted particularly all types of subsidiaries, these export platforms – together with R&D 
platforms (Kalotay, 2005) – are the most salient examples of subsidiaries in the “the new EU”. 
Export platform subsidiaries have grown in the new EU member states especially in the wake of 
the accession to the Union. Carmakers are drawn to these countries because they offer an 
inexpensive but skilled work force, low taxes, good highways and other logistics. They are 
strategically located in the geographic heart of Europe that is close not only to the European 
core, but also to the emerging markets in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet 
Union. 
Of the industries brought in or strengthened by inward FDI, electronics and automotive 
are particularly important from the point of view of enhancing competitiveness and structural 
upgrading (UNCTAD, 2002; Szanyi, 2006), as well as technological progress (Pavlínek, 2002). 
They differ however in the sense that FDI in electronics enhances technological upgrading but a 
weaker contribution to local supplier links, while the reverse is true to the automotive industry. 
For economies in transition, as they need to strengthen their domestic enterprises parallel with 
their opening to international transactions, automotive industry is one of the main channels of 
potential linkages with local suppliers, although often at the level of second-tier suppliers only in 
the initial phase of new projects (Ferenčíková and Fifeková, 2006). Additionally, the automotive 
industry has a strong a clustering effect on the host economy (Radosevic and Rozeik, 2005). 
In economies in transition, practically all projects are related to FDI. At the early stages of 
transition, countries with capacities inherited from communist times, such as the Czech Republic 
and Poland, opted for the privatisation of existing factories, while in countries where these 
capacities were lacking at the outset, greenfield projects dominated FDI in automotive from the 
outset (table 2). However, as time passed by, greenfield investment became the main form of 
FDI. It is important to note that in the longer run, differences between modes of entry 
(privatisation versus greenfield projects) have mattered little, as privatisation projects in most 
cases have in fact been „brownfield‟ projects, in which the initial sales have been followed by new 
investments by the new owners (Meyer and Estrin, 2001). In both cases, foreign owners were 
quick in introducing improved management and organisational practices (Pavlínek, 2002). The 
main differences between the two modes of entry lie in the level of local value added after the 
entry of foreign investors, which tended to be high in privatised plants and low in greenfield 
projects, with a tendency of convergence at later stages. It is also notable that local 
embeddedness has depended much on the technological sophistication of the assembly factories: 
high-technology projects such as Audi (Hungary) have had much more limited local sourcing 
than lower-technology projects such as Suzuki (Hungary) (UNCTAD, 2002). 
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Table 2. Economies in transition are host to large car assembly projects: examples, 
2007 
 
Country Location Producer Established Form of entry 
Czech Republic Mlada Boleslav Volkswagen/ Skoda 1991 Privatisation 
 Kolin Toyota/PSA  2002 Greenfield 
 Novosice Hyundai 2006 Greenfield 
Hungary Esztergom Suzuki 1991 Greenfield 
 Györ Audi 1992 Greenfield 
Poland Bielso Biala Fiat 1991 Privatisation 
 Poznan Volkswagen 1993 Greenfield 
 Warsaw Daewoo FSO 1996 Privatisation 
 Gliwice General Motors/Opel 1998 Greenfield 
Romania Pitesti Renault Dacia 1995 Privatisation 
Russian 
Federation 
Togliatti GM/AvtoVAZ joint 
venture 
2002 Privatisation 
 Vzhevolovsk Ford 2002 Greenfield 
 Moscow Renault 2005 Privatisation 
Slovakia Bratislava Volkswagen 1993 Privatisation 
 Trnava PSA/Peugeot 2003 Greenfield 
 Zilina Hyundai/KIA 2004 Greenfield 
Slovenia Novo Mesto Renault 1991 Privatisation 
Source: UNCTAD.     
FDI in automotive assembly has accentuated or exacerbated the differentiation between 
countries, especially the haves: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, 
Slovenia etc., and the have nots: large parts of the CIS (table 2). It has prompted a very quick rise 
of automotive output in winner countries (table 3), but often at the expense of creating 
dependence on a single industry in winner countries: Almost 25% of Slovakian GDP, for 
example, was generated by the automotive industry in 2007.  
 
Table 3. Production of passenger cars in selected countries, 2005–2007 
(Number of units) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 Change 2007/2005 (%) 
Czech Republic 596 774 848 799 925 778 55.1 
Poland 540 100 632 300 695 000 28.7 
Slovakia 218 349 295 391 571 071 161.5 
Hungary 148 553 187 633 287 982 93.9 
Romania 174 538 201 663 234 103 34.1 
Slovenia 138 393 119 212 174 209 25.9 
Source: European Automobile Manufacturers‟ Association. 
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Considering the overall decline in the automotive industry, it is questionable whether car-
making subsidiaries in new EU member states will sustain their success in the face of recession. 
Indeed, at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, orders were declining, resulting in less 
capacity utilisation (e.g. shorter work weeks) and layoff of some staff in all export platforms in 
economies in transition, affecting for example, Skoda and Toyota/PSA in the Czech Republic, 
Kia, Volkswagen and PSA in Slovakia, and Suzuki and Audi in Hungary. Volkswagen‟s Skoda 
Auto unit in the Czech Republic for example was cutting production to deal with slackening 
demand, and analysts say 10,000 automotive jobs could be eliminated in that country. 
However, some positive examples can be found. For example, recently3Audi invested 
€2.6 million in the plant in Gyor (Hungary) to integrate production of the engines into its existing 
lines. The 205kW engines are produced specifically for Audi TT RS model. In this respect, this 
unit of Audi is supposed to perform a role of a rationalised producer subsidiary. Furthermore, 
subsidiaries manufacturing smaller, inexpensive and fuel-efficient models seem to be affected 
later by the crisis. For example, in the Slovak town of Zilina, the Korean KIA produces the Cee'd 
sedan and Sportage SUV, marketed to low- and middle-class buyers. The impact of the crisis was 
a bit better contained than elsewhere. 
Another case when car production resists, at least partly, the recession, is the units with 
product mandates. Product mandates are “diamonds” in the subsidiary networks of MNEs; they 
engage in creative activities, and create value for an entire MNE. In principle, a MNE may be 
reluctant to close down or halt production in product mandate subsidiaries, unless its difficulties 
are so large that it has no other choice. Even in such a case, it is more rational to sell it to a 
potential buyer than to close it down. 
 
c. Job losses in foreign subsidiaries: the case of Hungary 
The global financial crisis has led to declining consumer demand, contracting economic 
activity and massive layoffs of workforce. This affected in particular the subsidiaries specialized in 
export platforms in industries hit by the crisis. In this section we take a closer look at the 
consequences of the crisis in terms of job losses in the case of the new EU member state of 
Hungary, felt mostly in its automotive industry. Hungary was particularly successful in attracting 
FDI projects for restructuring of the national economy in the 1990s. As a result of this FDI-led 
transition, the country has accumulated a large stock of foreign subsidiaries that became integral 
part of the national economy. Hence, Hungary represents an interesting case in order to assess 
the impact of the global financial crisis on foreign subsidiaries. 
Nevertheless, Hungary does not represent a unique case among new EU member 
countries which have based their economic development on FDI in export platforms and 
rationalised producer subsidiaries. Looking at the most recent national data on manufacturing 
output and exports (table 4), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia, 
for example, all show very similar decline in industrial output (over 20%), in exports (over 20%) 
and in the exports of the transport industry (over 40%),4 despite the perception that Hungary is 
one of the countries most affected by the crisis of 2008–2009, while the others, with the 
exception of Estonia, have coped better with the consequences of the market turmoil. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 ITDH Press Release on 30.03.2009. http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=showcontent_befekteto&content=09audi0330 
4 Car exports data were available for Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland only. 
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Table 4. Year-to-year changes in manufacturing output and exports, 
selected countries, February 2009 
Country 
Change in 
manufacturing  
output (%) 
Change in 
manufacturing  
exports (%) 
Change in the exports 
of transport 
equipment (%) 
Bulgaria -24.3 -39.2 -41.0a 
Czech Republic -23.4 -22.2 … 
Estonia -32.7 -26.0 -54.0 
Hungary -26.1 -30.4 -48.1 
Latvia -24.3 -29.3 … 
Lithuania -17.9 -21.8 -31.9 
Poland … -24.8 -25.7 
Romania -14.5 -15.9 … 
Slovakia -28.2 -31.0 … 
Slovenia -24.1 -25.1 -42.3b 
Source: Authors' calculation, based on national statistics.  
a Machinery and transport equipment.   
b January 2009   
 
In Hungary, used here as an example of the effects of the crisis, various major job cuts 
affected the subsidiaries of foreign MNEs over the six-month period November 2008–April 
2009 (table 5). As expected, the export-oriented subsidiaries of the car, electronics and garment 
industries, as well as the local market-oriented subsidiaries of foreign banks were the most 
affected by downsizing – in the case of the latter three industries firms involved in the creation of 
export platforms in the 1990s and now severely plagued by the collapse of international demand. 
Compared to foreign subsidiaries, local firms engaged less in job cuts. 
Despite this generally negative picture, it is notable that the total size of massive 
downsizing remained relatively limited, especially compared to the generalized increase in 
unemployment,5 derived from non-announced downsizings by smaller firms (according to 
Hungarian legislation, only mass downsizings need to the announced to the authorities). Another 
corollary of this situation is that the large job cuts carried out by foreign subsidiaries are required 
to be accompanied by more social measures (e.g. severance payments, assistance to job search) 
than the job cuts carried out by small firms. It does not mean however that the impact of plant 
closures would be negligible in terms of lost demand for local supplies and lost purchasing power 
of employees, especially in smaller localities where the foreign subsidiary used to be a major 
source of employment. This was clearly the case when Levi‟s announced in April 2009 the 
closure of its garment factory and fired its 549 employees in the 29,000 person locality of 
Kiskunhalas.6 
 
                                                 
5 According to the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the number of unemployed people increased from 327 900 in 
the pre-crisis period of August–October 2008, to 377 700 in December 2008–February 2009, an increase of almost 50 thousand 
(http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/fog/fog20902.pdf), compared to a direct job loss of about 8 thousand at the 
foreign subsidiaries (table 5). 
6 “Gyárbezárások, elbocsátások Bács-Kiskunban”, Magyar Narancs (Budapest), 9 April 2009, pp. 18–19. 
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Table 5. Selected cases of major job cuts in Hungary 
Announced in November 2008–April 2009 
Corporation Industry Number of job losses 
Foreign subsidiaries   
Suzuki Automotive 1 200 
Foxconn Electronics 1 095 
Jabil Circuit Electronics 900 
Linamar Car components 709 
Sanmina SCI Electronics 550 
Levi‟s Garments 549 
Digital Disc Drives (Bosch) Electronics 500 
Flextronics Electronics 400 
Syncreon Car components 400 
Van de Velde Garments 340 
Raiffeisen Banking 315 
CIB (Intesa Sanpaolo) Banking 300 
Magyar Telekom (Deutsche Telekom) Telecom 300 
Eybl Car components 230 
Falco (Kronospan) Wood processing 182 
Local firms   
Borsodchem Chemicals 550 
OTP Banking 550 
Ajka Kristály Glass 250 
Sources: Figyelő (Budapest), 9–15 April 2009, p.22, and Magyar Narancs (Budapest), 9 April 
2009, p.18. 
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4. Opportunities in the Times of Crisis 
a. Subsidiary evolution 
While FDI inflows are in general contracting, some subsidiaries are expanding their 
activities. The growth and evolution of subsidiaries in new EU member states can be split into 
two forms. Firstly, there is a conventional evolutionary path of subsidiary whereby the functional 
scope is being increased and competences are being enhanced. The global economic crisis does 
not seem to hamper such development for certain subsidiaries. Secondly, the global economic 
crisis provided new opportunities for new EU member states. By capitalising on their competitive 
advantages such as lower costs of workforce, flexible tax regimes and geographical proximity to 
important markets, these countries strengthen their investment attractiveness and competitive 
positions. We shall consider these two scenarios in more detail. 
The organic growth of certain subsidiaries continued in the times of crisis. A case in point 
is the Czech subsidiary of Honeywell, a major U.S. MNE producing a variety of consumer 
products, engineering services, and aerospace systems. In December 2008 it announced its 
intention to build its own research centre for aircraft engines over three years. The company 
intends to expand production of aircraft-engine components in Olomouc and is planning to hire 
400 additional engineers for its R&D lab in Brno. Honeywell plans to transfer a total of 700 jobs 
from its aircraft-engine production operation in Phoenix, Arizona, to the Czech Republic and 
Mexico. Moreover, the company also wants to expand its development centre in Brno, where it 
tests various types of turbine engines. When this process is complete, the company‟s most 
comprehensive testing centre for new-generation turbine engines will arise in the Czech Republic 
and employ 1100 people. This is a case whereby a subsidiary is moving from a pure export 
platform status towards elements of a product mandate. 
As this example shows, the subsidiary evolution was boosted by the transfer of some 
functions from its sister subsidiary in the U.S. In another scenario, MNEs prefer to rationalise 
their production structure in the European Union. Benefiting from the advantages of the Single 
European market, they might downsize their production in more expensive locations and transfer 
the production eastwards. In fact, the global economic crisis only accelerated such trend that 
started much earlier. In the past, Republic of Ireland used to be quoted a prime example of the 
country that has benefited from the European integration and large FDI inflows, serving as a 
gateway to Europe, primarily for U.S. MNEs. The “Celtic Tiger” was a model for many Central 
and Eastern European countries in their transition process (cf. Acs et al, 2007). As the global 
economic crisis unfolds, however, Ireland itself also faces major macroeconomic problems, as 
well as a partial loss of its export platforms. This movement in turn can benefit certain new EU 
member states. For example, the U.S. PC giant Dell decided to move its manufacturing 
operations from Ireland‟s Limerick to Poland‟s Lodz, at the expense of nearly 2,000 jobs in 
Ireland. This move concerns all production of goods bound for customers in Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa (EMEA). Dell cites simplifying operations, improving productivity and reducing 
costs as the main reasons for this relocation. 
This job loss for Ireland was compensated though by retaining its advanced, higher value 
added operations at the Limerick campus. Limerick is also home to a number of Dell‟s key 
European functions, which include its Centre of Competency for Communications and Network 
Product Development. The centre includes an R&D capability to develop software solutions for 
Dell‟s manufacturing sites worldwide. This anecdotal evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
underpinning elaborated in previous sections: while a decision to relocate assembly or 
manufacturing activities may be relatively straightforward and based on the cost-benefit analysis, 
a decision to relocate R&D functions may not be that easy. 
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b. Shared services centres 
As elaborated in the Section 2, the impact of the global financial crisis has been strongly 
felt in the automotive industry. Its impact, however, has been moderated in other industries. A 
case in point is shared services centres. For example, since early 2000s, new EU member states 
started emerging as prospective locations for Business process outsourcing (BPO), a form of 
outsourcing that involves the contracting of the operations and responsibilities of a specific 
business functions (or processes) to a third-party service provider, as well as off-shoring (near-
shoring) of corporate business functions. National investment agencies have been very enthused 
about this development and actively supporting it, since it reflects the national strategies of 
transformation towards the knowledge-based economy. As examples, we show below (Table 6) 
the most important centres located in Hungary until March 2009. Data show that the trend of 
locating shared services centres in the country started as early as in 2001, and it has intensified by 
now. 
 
Table 6. Selected shared services centres in Hungary, March 2009 
Firm Year Number of employees 
Amount invested  
(€ million) 
Tata Consultancy 
Services 
2001 910 81.38 
Diageo 2002 302 4.27 
SAP 2002 310 3.63 
Satyam 2002 60 15.44 
Alcoa 2003 190 ... 
IBMa 2003/2005 945 8.48 
EDS 2004 1 150 8.80 
ExxonMobil 2004 900 14.47 
Getronics 2005 510 4.32 
InBev Business Services 2006 380 2.81 
Morgan Stanley 2006 450 3.70 
IT Services Hungary 2007 1 745 7.78 
Vodafone 2007 746 4.95 
Citibank 2008 302 1.11 
Convergys 2008 282 1.30 
3M Plan … … 
Alstom Plan 160 … 
Christian Dior Plan … … 
    
Total  9 342 162.44 
Source: based on www.vilaggazdasag.hu/index.php?apps=cikk&cikk=264442 and 
www.vilaggazdasag.hu/index.php?apps=cikk&cikk=264759. 
a In March 2009, announced to add 290 more employees 
(www.itd.hu/engine.aspx?page=showcontent&content=09ibm0311). 
Note: Total number of centres: 50, employees: 20 000 
(www.itd.hu/engine.aspx?page=showcontent&content=09ibm0311). 
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The data show that the amount of foreign investment generated by shared services 
centres in is rather modest (€162.44 million in total). By their nature, projects of this kind are less 
capital-intensive than manufacturing projects. A much more important indicator of success is the 
number of new jobs created, since they contribute to employment. Besides, these jobs are 
preferred to those in manufacturing/assembly, since they are more knowledge-intensive and 
require higher qualification. 
The most important advantage of shared services centres in the context of the crisis is 
that they do not seem to be affected by the downturn. On the contrary, certain developments 
such as the devaluation of local currencies further increases the cost advantages located in the EU 
member countries. In Hungary, for example, data provided by the Hungarian Investment and 
Trade Development Agency (ITDH) reveal that despite the economic downturn, the country 
remains a prospective location for BPO and shared services centres. As mentioned in Table 5, in 
March 2009, IBM announced its decision to hire new staff for its data processing and operating 
system and network support centre in the Hungarian city of Szekesfehervar. This centre already 
employs 800 staff, and it plans to expand up to 1,000. The newly established job positions are 
almost exclusively highly qualified openings in the IT industry7. 
In a similar move, Vodafone plans to build a new regional customer service centre in 
Miskolc, in Northern Hungary. The infrastructure and IT investments will be started 2009 
creating 300 new jobs within 2 years. Important decision making factor was the favourable labour 
market, due to the high standards set by the University of Miskolc. This regional centre has the 
potential to service ‟other Vodafone countries‟ in the area later on, in the similar fashion as the 
Budapest service centre is doing presently8. 
Similar developments can be observed in Poland, another EU member state that has 
benefited from currency devaluation. Overall, the Polish Information and Foreign Investment 
Agency (PAIiIZ) reported that in 2008 it concluded 56 investment projects worth almost € 1.5 
billion, as a result some 15 000 new jobs were created9. As Table 7 shows, the highest number of 
new greenfield investment projects facilitated by PAIiIZ in 2008 were in the Shared Service 
Centres category. They were responsible for the largest number of new jobs created. The Czech 
agency CzechInvest reported about a larger amount of mediated greenfield investment projects in 
2008 (213 projects), however, with similar results – overall value of $1.77 billion, and leading to 
creation of 14 600 new jobs. The agency underlines that around 4 000 newly created jobs are for 
university graduates. 
Despite the global crisis, the projects of this type are on the rise. Early 2009, Poland 
witnessed establishment of a BPO centre by Indian company Zensar technologies in the city of 
Gdańsk. This € 1.8 million-worth investment project is to generate 350 new jobs (according to 
PAIIZ). 
From the examples above, it can be concluded that investment projects in BPO and 
Shared Service Centres may at least in part offset the ravaging consequences of crisis in the 
manufacturing (and automotive industry in particular). These projects are, however, less capital-
intensive, and require workforce with higher level of skills, competences and qualifications. 
Therefore, they cannot be easily considered in terms of employment opportunities for workforce 
laid off from manufacturing subsidiaries. 
 
                                                 
7 ITDH Press-Release on 06.04.2009. http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=showcontent_befekteto&content=09ibm0406 
8 ITDH Press-Release on 06.04.2009. http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=showcontent_befekteto&content=09voda0406 
9 PAIiIZ 2008 Report. http://www.paiz.gov.pl/index/?id=2f3c6a4cd8af177f6456e7e51a916ff3 
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Table 7. New investment projects in Czech Republic and Poland, 2008 
Industry 
Number of 
projects 
Number of jobs 
created Amount invested  
Czech Republic   $ million 
Production 79 7 255 (356) 1 565.16 
R&D 76 750 (481) 113.95 
Services 53 6 601 (3 114) 94.94 
Total 213 14 600 (4 000) 1 770.0 
Poland   € million 
Shared Service Centres 21 5 251 38.5 
Automotive 13 3 220 433.5 
Electronics 4 1 914 29.0 
R&D 4 225 1.9 
Chemical 3 235 20.0 
Total 56 15 000 1 500.0 
Sources: PAIiIZ Press-Release 
http://www.paiz.gov.pl/index/?id=2f3c6a4cd8af177f6456e7e51a916ff3 
CzechInvest Press-Release http://www.czechinvest.org/en/investments-in-2008-services-
surpasses-manufacturing-for-the-first-time 
Note: only investment projects facilitated by respective national investment promotion 
agencies – CzechInvest and PAIiIZ. 
Indicated in brackets – number of jobs for university graduates 
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5. Policy Implications 
 
The FDI downturn has a major impact on government policies. From a practical point of 
view, governments are faced with massive lay-offs and a shrinking tax base. As FDI inflows are 
declining, and some foreign MNEs are even divesting, people are losing their jobs at foreign 
subsidiaries, and fiscal revenues are dwindling, there is a pressure on host-country governments 
to compete more efficiently and more aggressively for their part from a shrinking cake. In turn, 
the pressure on home country governments is to save jobs at home, by convincing their MNEs 
to cease activities abroad and repatriate jobs to the home base. In a broader context, 
governments across the world need to implement structural reforms aimed at ensuring more 
stability in the global financial system and strengthen macro-economic foundations, which in turn 
can have a positive impact on FDI policies. 
In many countries, economic performance needs a “quick fix”. The temptation to 
recourse to protectionism and economic nationalism is high. In this respect, there is a certain 
asymmetry between the bargaining power of home and host countries: the former are 
headquartering the company centres in charge of the decision making process; they can also 
influence the behaviour off parent firms by fiscal measures. Compared to them, host countries 
competing with each other have weaker bargaining position, as a firm ceasing activities and 
leaving a country cannot be pressured the same way as a parent company. 
Effective FDI policies require measures that avoid “beggar-thy-neighbour” solutions. 
Public policy responses - at both the national and international levels in dealing with the financial 
crisis and its economic consequences – need to aim at creating favourable conditions for a 
relatively quick recovery in both FDI flows and economic growth. In a broader context, the 
challenges are to restore the credibility and stability of the financial system, to provide the “right” 
stimulus to investment, and to renew the commitment to an open economy. In the context of 
investment promotion, the challenges are to find new priorities (for example, replacing the 
automotive industry), and new measures (including a rethinking of the system of subsidies which 
in the current form has been to little avail in stopping job losses). In general, investment 
promotion has to keep up with the changes of the global FDI landscape: as most of the FDI 
these days takes place in services, investment promotion agencies should pay more attention to 
job creation in these activities.  
So far, the direct impact of the crisis on the policy and legal environment for FDI has 
been limited, with the exception of calls for more economic patriotism by certain countries, such 
as France, at the expense of export platform locations in developing and transition economies.10 
It is not yet clear at this juncture yet if these calls become policies, or intra-EU solidarity will be 
strong enough to stop them. For the moment being, most governments show commitment to 
FDI promotion, and implement policies to foster investment and nurture innovation. There are 
also concerns regarding the implications of the new policies of nationalisation and State control, 
as well as of signs of rising protectionism, for global capital flows. 
Today, it is widely acknowledged that public policies are to play a major role in the 
establishment of favourable conditions for a quick recovery of FDI flows. For the Governments 
of both developed and developing countries, it is important to maintain an overall favourable 
business and investment climate. If protectionism spreads, it can easily lead to an increasingly 
“lose-lose” situation in the middle of the crisis. In this regard, investment promotion agencies can 
play a proactive role in both retaining existing MNE activities and stimulating new investments. 
                                                 
10 In the case of the transfer of activities by Renault from Slovenia back to France in March 2009, it was not clear whether it was a 
first case of “reverse relocation”, as at the same time, other activities were expanded in Slovenia.  
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One has to ask if in the countries in transition in particular policies to attract FDI and 
benefit from it have been sufficient and the right ones from the point of view of desirable 
outcomes and resistance to crises. The uneven record of FDI and the negative effects of the 
crisis indicate that there is a need for a stronger link better investment promotion and industrial 
policy. The relationship between the quantity and the quality of FDI needs to be better 
understood, especially in the context of the crisis. 
While policies aimed at initial attraction of FDI flows (including investment incentives) 
have spread around the world, and to economies in transition in particular, policies targeting 
already established subsidiaries of MNEs remain rare. However, recent research (e.g. Costa and 
Filippov, 2008) emphasised that extension of FDI policy toward subsidiary development may be 
fruitful and bring benefits to the national economy. Subsidiary development should have a 
twofold goal: retaining foreign subsidiaries and contributing to their evolution. Naturally, this 
calls for the subsidiaries‟ embeddedness into national economic and innovation systems. 
Focus on the existing subsidiaries in the time of global economic downturn may be a 
winning strategy. It is evident that in the current conditions it will become even harder to 
compete for new FDI flows. On the other hand, new investment may come from subsidiaries‟ 
reinvested earnings and expansion of operations, leading to investment multiplicator and 
spillover effects in the national economy. Focus on foreign subsidiaries does not imply alienation 
of domestic firms or preferential treatment of subsidiaries. It is rather a set of policy measures 
complementary to the strategy of national economic development. 
In many countries of the world, and in new EU member states in particular, the crisis 
should accelerate policies aimed at upgrading their production base to higher value-added 
activities, especially in the form of investment in knowledge and innovation, and support to R&D 
function of foreign subsidiaries. The case of Hungary is illustrative. Early 2009, National 
Development and Economy Minister (currently – the Prime Minister of Hungary) Mr. Gordon 
Bajnai announced the government‟s decision to offer support to companies to keep their R&D 
staff, particularly in the automotive industry11. Later, the government announced its readiness to 
change its economic policy to offer incentives to foreign companies to set up bases in Hungary 
and restart the economy12. These policies are supposed to protect the existing competences of 
foreign subsidiaries and to retain the qualified workforce. 
                                                 
11 ITDH Press Release on 22.01.2009: http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=showcontent_befekteto&content=09news0122 
12 ITDH Press Release on 12.02.2009: http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=showcontent_befekteto&content=09news0211 
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Annex 1 FDI inflows, by region and major economy, 2007 and 2008 (billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Region / economy 
FDI inflows 
2007 2008 a Growth rate (%) 
World 1 940.9 1 658.5 -14.5 
Developed economies 1 341.8 1 001.8 -25.3 
Europe 920.9 559.0 -39.3 
European Union 864.0 544.9 -36.9 
Austria 29.7 12.4 -58.2 
Belgium 70.0 94.2 34.6 
Czech Republic 10.6 10.9 2.6 
Denmark 11.8 10.9 -7.8 
Finland 12.4 -4.2 -134.0 
France 158.0 126.1 -20.2 
Germany 56.4 24.9 -55.8 
Hungary 6.1 6.6 7.7 
Ireland 30.6 -12.3 -140.2 
Italy 40.2 13.3 -66.9 
Netherlands 118.4 -3.5 -103.0 
Poland 23.0 16.5 -28.0 
Romania 9.9 13.3 34.1 
Spain 68.8 65.5 -4.8 
Sweden 22.1 40.4 83.1 
United Kingdom 196.4 96.8 -50.7 
Other developed economies       
United States 232.8 320.9 37.8 
Japan 22.5 19.0 -15.6 
Developing economies 512.2 549.1 7.2 
Africa 53.5 72.0 34.7 
Egypt 11.6 9.5 -18.0 
Morocco 2.6 2.0 -20.5 
South Africa 5.7 9.0 58.0 
Latin America and the Caribbean 127.3 139.3 9.4 
Argentina 5.7 7.3 27.9 
Brazil 34.6 45.1 30.3 
Chile 12.6 16.8 33.5 
Colombia 9.0 10.6 16.7 
Mexico 27.2 18.6 -31.6 
Peru 5.4 4.1 -24.8 
Asia and Oceania 331.4 337.8 1.9 
West Asia 71.5 61.4 -14.2 
Turkey 22.0 18.0 -18.4 
South, East and South-East Asia 258.7 275.2 6.4 
China 83.5 92.4 10.6 
Hong Kong, China 59.9 63.0 5.2 
India 25.1 46.5 85.1 
Indonesia 6.9 8.3 20.4 
Malaysia 8.5 8.0 -5.6 
Singapore 31.6 22.7 -28.0 
Thailand 11.2 10.1 -10.2 
South-East Europe and the CIS 86.9 107.6 23.8 
Russian Federation 52.5 70.3 34.0 
Ukraine 9.9 10.7 8.1 
Source: UNCTAD, 2009. a - Preliminary estimates. Note: World FDI inflows in 2008 are projected on the basis of data for 103 economies for 
which data were available for part of 2008 as of 6 April 2009. Data for which only part of 2008 were available were estimated by annualising the 
data. The proportion of inflows to these economies in total inflows to their respective region or subregion in 2007 is used to extrapolate the 2008 
data.  
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